

DD/A 74-4548

20 NOV 1974

**MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence**

**SUBJECT : The Headquarters Building Tube System**

1. Reference is made to your note of 18 September 1974, and the attached memorandum from the Director of Current Intelligence, which suggested that the operating hours of the Headquarters pneumatic tube system be extended to at least 1800 hours, Monday through Friday, to facilitate the late afternoon paper flow between the DD/I and the DD/O.

2. This is to advise that I asked both the Offices of Logistics and Security to work on the problem in some detail, and this accounts for the delay in my response. To effect a change in the operating hours, as you will note from Attachment A, it will be necessary to have activated until that hour all three systems of the total network: System A (amber carriers) serving the DD/O; System B (green carriers) serving the DCI and DD/A areas plus some components of the DD/I; and System C (red carriers) serving the DD/I with one station each in the DD/A and the DD/S&T. It will also be necessary to have activated until that hour two manual transfer stations, one controlled by the OCI Registry (Room 7G-15) and one controlled by the Information Services Group, DD/O (Room GB-38). In all, 112 tube stations would be involved in the extended hours. The details of this entire network as to station locations and custodians are summarized under Attachment B.

3. The Office of Security has examined subject proposal in detail and concluded that its implementation without some new security administrative safeguards would introduce a significant risk. This conclusion is based on the following factors:

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a. The combination of human errors (misdialing) and electrical/mechanical malfunctions delivers a potential for carriers to go into unmanned tube stations after hours where they can remain until discovered by Federal Protective Officers effecting security checks. This latter situation could prevail for many hours which, in the case of sensitive and classified information, represents an obvious vulnerability. There have been twelve such incidents over the past eighteen months.

b. Although the tube stations are constructed of metal and equipped with a three-way combination lock, they do not provide the requisite protection for the storage of classified material, unless located in vaults, secure areas or in offices which are manned on a 24-hour basis.

c. Of the 112 tube stations in the total network, 42 are located in either vaults, secure areas or areas manned on a 24-hour basis, and these 42 stations would not pose a security problem if subject proposal were implemented. Attachment B labels these stations as "P" (protected) stations.

d. It is, therefore, the remaining 70 tube stations labeled as "O" (unprotected) which are of concern in the context of this proposal. An analysis of the custodial assignments of the latter 70 stations reveals that they relate to 27 different office or staff components spread throughout the Directorates and the Offices of the DCI.

4. In effect, the Office of Security's concern relates to carriers misdirected to tube stations in open offices where the custodians have departed for the day. Again, there is an admitted inability to preclude errant transmissions to tube stations located in open office areas, i.e., outside a vault, secure area, etc. In order to keep tube station security on a par with other aspects of Headquarters office security, it would be necessary for those 27 offices having one or more

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unprotected stations to arrange for a security check of such stations following the system deactivation at 1800 hours. This seems somewhat impractical in that the cure would be worse than the illness.

5. The thought occurs that there must be a less complicated solution than having 27 components make adjustments in their working hours and standard office procedures. What I have in mind is the use of a few couriers, on an overtime basis, to serve as runners between the Intelligence and Operations Directorates from 1630 to 1830 hours on a daily basis. Most certainly the hours could be expanded, and the number of couriers could be increased, dependent upon OCI needs during a crisis or emergency period. It would seem that there would be built-in flexibility without disrupting large elements of the Agency.

6. You may recall that the Management Committee has taken action on the centralization of the courier system; Mr. [ ] of the Logistics Services Division is serving as Chairman of the Courier Consolidation Committee; and Mr. [ ] is your designated representative to the committee. I would suggest that you have someone who is familiar with the OCI problem get in touch with Mr. [ ] and work out the details of a joint OCI/OL solution, within the overall framework of the courier system, rather than the tube system.

/s/ John F. Blake

John F. Blake  
Deputy Director  
for  
Administration

Atts

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